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ABSTRACT: While extensive literature exists on how economic globalisation has 
limited developing countries’ policy space for industrial policy, the literature on how 
it has affected advanced economies remains scant. We utilise original archival 
material to analyse the activities of the German public development bank, the 
Kreditantstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), in order to shed light on an important, but 
neglected aspect of German industrial policy. We analyse how the KfW responded to 
multiple challenges after the rise of economic globalisation, including a funding 
crisis, international agreements to limit export subsidies and Europeanisation. We 
argue that KfW  successfully managed to navigate these challenges in order to retain, 
and even increase, its ability to conduct selective industrial policy in the post- 1980s 
era. This was possible because of Germany’s hard currency and low sovereign credit 
risk, large market size, which was augmented by membership in the European Union, 
and Germany’s position as regional hegemon within Europe. More broadly, this 
shows how, conditional on domestic politics, advanced economies are able to shape 
and exploit the rules of the international economic system to increase state 
intervention in the allocation of credit, for industrial policy purposes, even as 
developing countries are given the opposite policy recommendations. 
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INTRODUCTION: POLICY AUTONOMY FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY  
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and recession, ‘market 
fundamentalism’ is increasingly being rejected even by those that were once its core 
advocates (Hopewell 2017), and industrial policy4  has enjoyed something of a 
renaissance (Warwick 2013; Wade 2012), even in advanced economies due to fears 
over de-industrialisation and their declining share in global manufacturing (Hopewell 
2017). The debate is no longer about whether industrial policy is necessary, but about 
whether it should conform to, or defy, comparative advantage (Chang and Lin 2009; 
Lin 2010, 2011; Wade 2011) with even neoclassical economists making the case for 
industrial policy (Hausmann and Rodrik 2006; Lin 2012). This renewed interest has 
led scholars and policy makers alike to question how much remaining ‘policy space’ 
countries still have for conducting industrial policies, in the wake of financial and 
trade liberalisation since the 1980s, and the proliferation of multilateral and regional 
trade and investment agreements since the 1990s (Aggarwal and Evenett 2014; 
UNCTAD 2014), reigniting interest in the longstanding debate over the effects of 
globalisation on the domestic policy autonomy of the nation-state.  
This paper advances this debate in the area of advanced economies’ policy space 
for selective industrial policy, by examining the case of how one of the world’s 
largest industrialised economies, Germany, continues to use state-owned banks to 
allocate credit to priority sectors in order to conduct industrial policy despite the 
challenges of economic globalisation. This is done through a focus on the activities of 
its largest national development bank, the Kreditantstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)5, 
from the post-war era to the present. Against the backdrop of IMF sponsored bank 
privatisation that has swept the developing world since the 1980s (Andrews 2005), 
and the sharp decline of state-owned banking across OECD economies under 
liberalisation pressures (Verdier 2000), Germany still retains the most nationally 
important state-owned development bank in the world when measured by total assets 
as a percentage of GDP. With total assets of nearly 500bn Euro, the KfW is even 
more important to its national economy than the BNDES or China Development Bank 
are to Brazil and China respectively (Humphrey 2015, 3), and is unique in terms of 																																																								
4 Industrial policy is defined as ‘any policy that attempts to affect the evolution of specific industries 
through state intervention in order to effect national efficiency and growth’ (Chang 1994).  
5 The bank underwent a name change to ‘KfW’ in 2012. Throughout the paper we will use the 
abbreviation ‘KfW’. 
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size compared to other advanced economy investment banks (EAPB 2016, 9-11). We 
argue that because of its powerful position in the global political economy, augmented 
by membership in the European Union, and its position as regional hegemon in 
Europe, Germany was able to navigate the challenges posed by globalisation after the 
1970s, including a funding crisis, international agreements to limit export subsidies, 
and Europeanisation, and increase state intervention in the allocation of credit 
through KfW. This shows that despite the constraints of globalisation, advanced 
economies still retain significant ‘room to move’ in pursuing a proactive industrial 
policy through the financial sector, contingent on their domestic politics being 
supportive of such policies. 
 
Globalisation and policy space in advanced and developing economies 
 
Scholars have argued for decades that globalisation has led to a process of 
‘neoliberal convergence’, where market forces and threats of exit by capital have 
dramatically restricted state intervention (Strange 1996; Drezner 2001; Garrett 1998), 
and a move towards a market-based financial system approximating the Anglo-Saxon 
ideal type, as globalisation erodes national heterogeneity (Dore 2008; Engelen 2008; 
Maxfield et al 2017). In the area of  industrial policy, a wealth of literature argues that 
developing countries’ policy space for industrial policy has shrunk due to trade and 
investment agreements, (Gallagher 2005;Shadlen 2005; Wade 2003), including in the 
financial realm, where the IMF and World Bank have advocated for the dismantling 
of industrial policy tools such as public development banks, interest rate controls, and 
directed credit programs which were historically used to direct credit towards 
strategic sectors (Cull 1997). 
This ‘convergence’ hypothesis has come under much criticism, with scholars 
instead emphasising continued diversity in national economic systems despite 
globalisation (Boyer and Drache 1996; Maxfield 2017; Weiss 1998; Wade 1996; 
Zysman 1996), and arguing that the strength of and response to external pressures is 
determined domestically (Helleiner 1995; Weiss 1998). Furthermore, globalisation 
can have important ‘state augmenting’ effects, because not only can external 
liberalisation bring increased demands for the state to compensate for externally 
induced economic volatility (Garrett 1998; Mosley 2005; Weiss 2005b). It can also 
increase demands for states to intervene to accomplish industrial policy objectives, 
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(Breznitz and Zysman 2013). In the realm of industrial policy, scholars have argued 
that external constraints on national industrial policy have been greatly exaggerated, 
citing the apparent ease with which governments increased economic interventionism 
in response to the 2008 crisis (Aggarwal and Evenett 2014; Lewis 2014; Oh 2014). 
Others argue that while increased interdependence has increasingly proscribed 
traditional industrial policy tools such as tariffs, governments have overcome these 
constraints by becoming more creative in order to assure traditional economic policy 
objectives with new means (Clift and Woll 2012; Weiss 2005b).  
A related branch of scholarship has argued that there is a difference between the 
extent to which globally powerful industrialised and weaker developing countries are 
able to adapt to these external pressures (Mosley 2003; Rudra 2002), and pursue a 
proactive approach to sectoral promotion under globalisation (Weiss 2005b). 
Development scholars argue that more powerful advanced economies are able to 
shape the rules of the global economy in their favour, and ‘make room to move’ 
(Weiss 2005a) under the same international agreements that limit developing 
countries’ policy space. This is done by shaping the international order in a way that 
best suits their current development trajectory (Weiss 2005a), and preventing 
developing countries from undertaking the same policies that they used in their own 
industrialisation phases, in a process known as ‘kicking away the ladder’ Chang 
(2002). Yet with some notable exceptions (Block 2008; Hopewell 2017; Mazzucato 
2013; Wade 2017) there remains an important gap in the literature on how developed 
countries actually pursue their industrial policy objectives under globalisation.  
To contribute towards filling this gap, we analyse how one of the worlds’ largest 
and most successful industrial economies, Germany, has continued to conduct 
industrial policy through its public development banks despite the challenges of 
globalisation. Public development banks have historically been a key tool of industrial 
policy in both developing and advanced economies, including Korea, Japan, China, 
India, Brazil, the US, and France to name a few. Development banks acted as the 
state’s agent for allocating long-term (often subsidised) credit to targeted industries 
considered vital for growth, but which the private sector was too risk-averse to 
finance (Amsden 2001; Kindleberger 2015; Mazzucato and Penna 2016; Mertens and 
Thiemann 2017; Verdier 2000). These banks do not necessarily need to have a large 
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financing volume to be effective in influencing the sectorial allocation of resources6; 
their finance is often concentrated in very large, economically important projects that 
have spill-over effects for the rest of the economy (Hopewell 2017), and they often 
play a catalytic role in attracting private sector finance to otherwise unattractive 
projects (Griffith-Jones 2016).  
We argue that with the support of the Ministries of Finance and Economics, 
KfW has been able to been able to increase its size, and maintain a wide range of its 
post-war sectoral targeting activities, despite growing external constraints and 
domestic challenges that emerged after the 1970s, including 1.Funding pressures that 
intensified after the 1980s, as pressures to reign in government spending became more 
salient 2. New international trade regulations limiting subsidised export finance, one 
of KfW’s key industrial policy tools 3. Europeanisation, specifically, the EU State 
Subsidies law, which aimed to limit member states industrial policy.  
Our findings on KfW’s post-1980s role in selective industrial policy challenge 
the assumption made in the ‘convergence’ literature that financial globalisation and 
the proliferation of trade and investment agreements has made many forms of 
industrial policy non-viable. Even as the German financial system converged in some 
respects to a more market-based system, state intervention increased at the same time,  
not only to ‘compensate’ productive sector firms for a decline in private bank finance 
after liberalisation, but also to continue promoting strategic sectors as part of 
industrial policy in order to make domestic firms more internationally competitive. 
Furthermore, rather than impeding KfW’s directed lending, globalisation actually 
enabled it in important ways; without the process of financial globalisation that began 
in the 1980s, the deep and liquid international capital markets on which KfW began 
funding itself, once domestic budgetary funds were no longer forthcoming, would not 
exist.  
However, our research also points to the fact that globalisation may not have 
equally state augmenting effects for all countries. The German case illustrates the 
advantages that advanced economies have over developing countries in navigating the 
constraints of globalisation to further their own industrial competitiveness. Germany’s 
hard currency and low credit risk for its public securities was vital in enabling KfW to 																																																								
6 For example as of December 2015 KfW’s lending volume makes up 14% of total loans to the non-
financial corporate sector by banks in Germany (KfW 2015; Bundesbank timeseries database). 
However figure dramatically understates its importance, since KfW finance is targeted only towards 
specific sectors, and is meant to be catalyzing in nature. 
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raise the international capital market funds that enabled its expansion. Similarly, its 
powerful position in the global political economy, augmented by Germany’s 
membership in the EU, and its position as regional hegemon in Europe, allowed it to 
shape international trade and European integration agreements, and exploit loopholes 
in them, to KfW’s advantage. However, just because advanced economies have more 
‘room to move’, does not mean they take advantage of it. This is conditional on the 
domestic politics. While KfW enjoyed strong Ministerial and cross-party support, 
other advanced economies, such as the US, were held back from conducting similar 
policies for domestic political reasons.  
Our analysis of KfW’s industrial policy activities relies heavily on archival annual 
reports (1949-2015) we obtained from the KfW office in Berlin. Using these reports, 
we collected and analysed data on KfW’s financial information, funding sources, and 
lending activities by sector. The annual reports were also used qualitatively to 
understand historical shifts in KfW’s business model, industrial policy priorities, and 
relationship with the Federal Ministries. In order to supplement the archival data, we 
conducted five interviews with key officials from the KfW, the Association of Public 
Banks (Verband öffentlicher Banken -VOEB), Association for Savings and Regional 
banks (Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband - DSGV), SME association 
(Deutscher Mittelstandsverband), the public development bank of Berlin 
(Investitionsbank Berlin). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The empirical section begins by 
introducing KfW’s governance structure to establish that KfW’s activities are a 
reflection of broader government policy. We then outline KfW’s industrial policy 
priorities during the post-war era. Next, we discuss some of the major challenges 
KfW faced after the 1970s, and show how it was able to navigate these challenges in a 
way that allowed it to maintain its core industrial policy priorities, while still abiding 
by the official rules of the international financial and trading systems. Finally, we 
compare KfW’s post-80s industrial policy with the post-war model in order to argue 
that while there have been some important changes, many of KfW’s core industrial 
policy functions remain..  
 
CONTEXT: KFW, THE DEVELOPMENT BANK FOR GERMANY 
 
KfW was originally set up in 1948, in order to channel Marshall Plan funds for 
reconstruction into the real economy, under the ‘Law for KfW’ (Gesetz über die 
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Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau), with a mandate to ‘performing promotional tasks, in 
particular, financings, pursuant to a state mandate’ (KfW Law, Art 2(1)). The close 
relationship between the Federal Ministries and KfW is manifested in a Federal 
Government public guarantee, enshrined in law (KfW Law, Art 1a) as well as in 
KfW’s governance structure. Historical analysis of KfW’s board membership shows 
that the Finance Minister usually serves as a chairman of the Board of directors, and 
the Economics Minister as the Deputy, with representatives of various other federal 
ministries, industry, trade, and banking associations, trade unions and members of the 
Bundesrat, the legislative body representing Germany's federal states filling other 
seats (KfW annual reports, various years).  
Our interviews confirm the close collaboration between KfW and the 
government lasts to this day. According to a KfW employee ‘Meetings are held 
frequently and there is great trust between the entities… Usually the ministries BMWi 
[Economic Affairs and Energy] and BMF [Finance] come up with the initiative to 
finance programmes. With an idea at hand the ministries ask the KfW for a feasibility 
plan. The bank proposes how much credit and how to implement the programme… 
Sometimes the bank tries to influence or promote ideas by directly talking to MPs, 
who then contact their friends in the respective working groups’ (Interview, KfW 
employee). According to a representative of the VOEB, the organisation that lobbies 
on behalf of German public banks ‘KfW doesn’t really need help with lobbying 
domestically, it basically is the Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Finance’ 
(Interview, VOEB). In 2015 a list of lobby representatives with unlimited access to 
the German parliament revealed that KfW had the highest number of lobbyists who 
were free to enter the parliament any time and without prior appointment (FAZ 2015).   
 
KFW IN THE POST WAR ERA  
 
From its inception KfW played and important role in sectoral targeting in the 
German economy. According to KfW’s Vice President Hermann J. Abs, ‘The KfW’s 
activities [during the post-war era] were not exactly oriented to an ideal picture of a 
free market economy. To be precise, it was engaged in directing investments’ (Abs, 
cited in Harries 1998, 37-8). From early on, KfW’s annual reports state the main 
economic problem was not capital shortage but that ‘available capital has been 
misdirected in the economic sense which has so far been preventing the supply of 
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sufficient investment capital to those branches of industry that are of decisive 
importance for building up the foundations on which production must be based‘ (KfW 
1950, 21-22).   
A clear priority for KfW was the promotion of high technology, high value 
added manufacturing because ‘specializing in processes of an advanced technological 
level not only ensures a competitive position on the world market but also 
simultaneously makes an essential contribution to the shift in the structure needed 
within our economy’ (KfW 1975, 72). KfW considered the capital goods sector 
especially important due to its ‘ technological lead on other sectors’, for its role in job 
creation, as well as because innovation in the sector was considered to ‘have a bearing 
upon other sectors and often create the prerequisite for further increases in their 
productivity’ (KfW 1975, 72).  
KfW’s international financing operations, especially its provision of long-term 
export finance in its capacity as an official (state supported) export credit agency 
(ECA), was considered necessary to ‘maintain the competitiveness of German 
enterprises in specific export markets’ (KfW 1974, 69) especially to further 
promotion of capital goods in order to achieve economies of scale: ‘[T]he objective of 
general export financing is to facilitate the development of plants requiring 
application of complex technological know-how, the German domestic market would 
often be too small for the development and economical manufacture of such plants’ 
(KfW 1974, 72). The creation of a current account surplus was seen as vital to 
maintaining a strong currency, and was a priority for KfW during period when 
Germany experienced a deficit. In the 1950s, KfW reports state ‘the task is now to 
reduce the adverse trade balance which has arisen’ (KfW 1950, 19) and recommends 
restricting domestic consumption in order to ‘increase exports further, and to that 
extent to achieve equilibrium fairly soon’ (KfW 1950, 19). Between 1979 and 1982 
when Germany again dealt with a deficit (1982, 19), KfW reports outlined its role in 
generating current account surplus: ‘Long-term finance for export transactions helps 
to strengthen the competitiveness of German exporters, which in turn lends support to 
the endeavours at safeguarding and boosting sales in foreign markets. In this way, a 
substantial contribution is made to reducing the German current account deficit and 
securing jobs at home’ (KfW 1981, 17).  
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Although not necessarily large in comparison to total German export value7, 
KfW’s export finance played an important role in facilitating large projects in capital 
goods sectors like industrial plants, aircraft, and ships, and risky new markets where 
the large private sector banks were unwilling to lend either because the required loan 
volume was too large, or the project was too risky (Harries 1998). KfW’s export 
finance was provided both to the German company, as well as to the foreign buyer of 
German goods, and was highly subsidised, in order to help German exporters win 
international contracts away from competitors and capture newly independent 
developing country export markets. It was also highly selective; the ‘general export 
financing’ program aimed to promote exports of industrial plant and machinery by a 
relatively small group of well-known firms such as Siemens, Krupp, Ferrostaal, Ihde, 
Fritz Werner and AEG to the major newly independent developing economies, 
(Harries 1998, 93), while specific export finance programs targeting shipping and 
aircrafts exports were set up separately (KfW annual reports).  
Export financing was complemented by FDI finance to encourage outward 
investment by German companies, loans for raw materials procurement, and tied and 
untied development aid, all at below market rates. The purpose was to open 
developing economies to German exports and FDI (KfW annual reports, various 
years). Over 60 % of development aid provided by KfW usually went directly back to 
German firms, with the majority of projects being executed by German engineering 
firms (KfW 1980, 98).  
KfW’s domestic activities during this time were ‘orientated towards 
promoting structural objectives within economic branches and development areas’ 
(KfW 1968, 84), and included long-term subsidised domestic lending, carried out 
through on-lending programs with other private and public banks, and supported high 
value added manufacturing both directly and indirectly. After the initial postwar 
reconstruction period, KfW ‘increasingly concentrated its activity on long-term 
industrial lending. The initial inducement was the necessity -in view of the absence of 
any capital market and the enterprises' difficulties in financing out of their own capital 
resources’ (KfW 1968, 87). In addition to direct aid to the manufacturing sector, 
especially mechanical and electrical engineering, vehicle and ship building, a 																																																								
7 The total value of exports that KW helped to finance in 1974 was about 10 % of the export volume of 
durable capital goods to developing countries, the share of the latter in total German exports in turn 
amounts to roughly 5 % (KfW 1974, 72).  
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substantial amount was spent on supporting sectors such as manufacturing research 
and development, basic goods industries such as steel and basic chemicals, housing 
construction, transport and communication (KfW annual reports, various years), with 
priority accorded to ‘sunrise’ ‘projects in the structurally little developed areas subject 
to promotion by the public authorities’ (KfW 1968, 84).   
KfW also provided special subsidies to improve the productivity of declining 
industries such as steel, coal, shipbuilding, and textiles, in order to ‘increase the 
efficieny [sic] of existing productive capacities-by switching from one form of 
production to another, by amalgamating productive plants, or by introducing modern 
technical methods’ (KfW 1968, 84), and to  ‘promote the procurement of plant and 
equipment needed to start new manufacturing operations with more favourable future 
prospects.’ (KfW 1970, 120). From 1971 onwards, programmes targeted towards 
financing investment for SMEs (the Mittelstands or ‘M’ Programmes) became 
increasingly important because KfW considered that SMEs ‘are faced with greater 
difficulties in financing than their competitors [large firms]. With a view to offsetting 
this disadvantage and ‘to inducing them to effect certain investments, the Federal 
Government has developed various programmes in favour of such enterprises’ (KfW 
1970, 121, emphasis added). This matched the increasing need for highly specialised 
SME firms servicing industrial needs in research, development, communications etc. 
(KfW 1971). 
A good example of how KfW conducted selective industrial policy during the 
post-war era is its promotion of large civil aircraft. This sector fell under the special 
category of sectors that were important ‘to Germany from the viewpoint of energy 
supply or technology’ (KfW 1975, 32). Promotion of aircraft exports was considered 
important because ‘the domestic market [was] offering little sales possibilities’, and 
‘only by the aid of export can larger series of production be achieved, which are 
necessary to make production economical and ensure high technological standards’ 
(KfW 1975, 32). The government’s aim was to help Airbus, Europe’s largest aircraft 
manufacturer, formed in 1970, gain share in the world market, at a time when it was 
dominated by American manufacturers Boeing, Douglass, and Lockheed (Harries 
1998, 135-137).   
Due to the large financing volumes and high risk inherent to the sector, private 
banks were unable to play a leading role in financing Airbus’s exports at this time 
(Harries 1998, 135). KfW was therefore commissioned to finance the initially loss-
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making Airbus by the Ministry of Economics as part of a coordinated interstate effort 
between Germany and its European partners (KfW 1975, 62). KfW received special 
funds from the Ministry of Economics, which it used to provide subsidised export 
loans and grants for the export of aircraft, backed by government guarantees (KfW 
1975, 62).  This enabled Airbus to sell aircraft to the most risky American buyers8 
which would never have received private sector loans, in order to penetrate the US 
home market, and expand production. This international strategy was complemented 
by domestic loans and grants for aircraft construction and aviation research and 
development (KfW 1967, 1975).  With the help of this large state-financial capacity, 
from having only a five percent market share in 1970, Airbus was able to make 
significant inroad by the early 1980s, and sell its product to top rated airlines in the 
US, European, and East Asian markets, even though it continued to remain far behind 
Boeing (Harries 1998; Mujamdar 1987).  
 
CHALLENGES TO KFW IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION: ROLLING 
BACK OR SCALING UP? 
 
Faced with multiple shocks after the 1970s, including the oil crisis, and over 
two decades of post-war growth giving way to economic crisis and stagflation, the 
post-war German model saw profound changes. Rhetoric with regards to the role of 
the state and financial liberalisation changed over the course of the 1980s across the 
political spectrum, while changes in policy gained steam by the 1990s (Kitterer 1998, 
231-3; Sablowski 2009). From the 1980s onwards, among the voices calling for fiscal 
prudence were increasingly prominent politicians in the liberal Free Democratic Party 
(Abelshauser 2001, 135), while parliamentary working groups started demanding 
better monitoring of tools for industrial policy, including a more strict assessment of 
state subsidies (Bundesdrucksache 1984). Similar to other advanced economies, 
Germany underwent a process of domestic financial liberalisation after the 1980s, 
with its financial sector moving increasingly towards speculative financial activities 
(Detzer et al. 2013), and culminating in the dismantling of Deutschland AG in the 
1990s (Beyer and Höppner 2003). On the international level, capital account 
liberalisation after the 1970s and the proliferation of international trade and 
investment agreements during the 1990s, including the Europeanisation process, 																																																								
8 For example, KfW financed sales to Eastern Airlines in 1978, one of the weakest American airlines, 
which later became insolvent. (Harries 1998, 136)  
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presented a new set of challenges.  
 
Figure 1: KfW’s assets and lending commitments, as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: KfW annual reports, various issues, Federal Statistics Office.  
Note: Commitments include loans, grants and guarantees, exclude advisory and services; DM GDP 
calculated at the official exchange rate of 1 EUR=1.95583 DM for the time period between 1965 and 
1999. 
 
KfW not only survived the ‘neoliberal turn’, but became even more important, 
scaling up its operations dramatically, especially after the 1990s (see figure 1). KfW 
faced a series of increased demands for its funds during the post-80s era. As the large 
private banks of Deutschland AG, which had previously played an important role in 
providing long term-finance to German industry, moved away from real-economy 
lending towards fees based and speculative activities after the 1970s (Deeg 1999 p. 
80), KfW stepped in to fill the gap. KfW also faced increased demand for its popular 
‘M’ programs9 (Harries 1998, 162) as financial liberalisation caused a deterioration of 
credit conditions for SMEs (Bluhm and Schmidt 2008, 34; Deeg 1999 p. 60). KfW’s 
importance increased even faster during the 90s and 2000s (see figure 1), as the 
financial sector was further liberalised, Deutschland AG was dismantled, and German 
Reunification created fresh demand for KfW funds (KfW 1990-4).  After the 2008 
financial crisis, KfW took over Deutschland AG’s stabilisation function and played an 
important countercyclical role, causing demand for its funds to reach new heights. 																																																								
9 These programs have been important in financing SME investment since the 1980s; in 1985 the KfW 
financed 45% of total investment of manufacturing Small enterprises (revenues less than 5mn DM), 
and 20-25% of medium firms (revenues between 5-10 mn. DM) (Götte 1988) 
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Domestic lending was ramped up in the years after the crisis to ensure real economy 
firms a stable supply of long-term credit, and rescue ailing firms (figure 1; KfW 
annual reports, various years). In the context of the challenges posed by economic 
globalisation mentioned above, how did KfW achieve this impressive increase in the 
size of its operations? 
 
Managing the funding crisis: KfW goes to the international financial markets 
 
 
At the same time as KfW faced an increased demand for its financing, 
concerns over budget deficits and inflation became more salient after the 1980s, and 
intensifying in the 1990s with the introduction of the Maastricht Criteria, resulting in 
a funding problem. KfW resolved this dilemma by using its state guarantee to switch 
its major funding source from budgetary funds to low-cost borrowing on international 
and domestic capital markets, since KfW’s lending from funds raised on private 
markets did not contribute to the government debt10. KfW’s capital market operations 
after the 1980s were so successful that it was able to fund a massive expansion, 
despite domestic fiscal constraints. KfW was one of the first national development 
banks to follow in the footsteps of the supranational World Bank and European 
Investment Bank in tapping into international capital markets (Licari 1969), 
During the post-war era KfW relied mainly on Federal Government and 
European Recovery Program (ERP) funds,11 with public funds making up over 60 % 
of KfW’s total funding volume (KfW annual reports, 1950-1970), and privately raised 
funds playing only a supporting role (KfW 1966, 68). Even though these pressures to 
control government spending increased through the late 1970s (Walter 1992), the 
Federal government was cautious about allowing KfW to raise funds from 
international sources. Until the mid-80s, KfW was confined to raising private funds 
domestically in the underdeveloped German capital markets (Harries 1998, 103), on 
which KfW could only issue intermittently and expensively (KfW 1965, 1974), which 
limited the scale of its operations. 																																																								10	Self-financed loans made by KfW do not count towards core Federal budgets, and 
only the direct allocation from Federal or ERP budgets, have to be recorded in the 
State Subsidies Reports (Subventionsberichte der Bundesregierung) as an officially 
declared subsidy (Bundesbank 2000, 18).	
11 The ERP fund was set up under the Marshall Plan, but when the Marshall plan ended in 1953, it was 
turned into a revolving fund for long-term investment loans, which grew over the decades due to the 
interest being accrued (KfW annual reports, various years).  
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The breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 1970s  contributed to the Federal 
government abandoning its prior caution and allowing KfW to step up its efforts to 
issue bonds on foreign capital markets by the mid-80s (KfW 1984, 20). This was seen 
to have additional advantages; borrowing costs were much lower compared to 
domestic markets, and it was expected that KfW would play a leading role in opening 
up foreign capital markets for other German firms (KfW 1987, 51-52). In order to 
gain credibility on international markets, KfW was one of the first German 
institutions to apply for a Moody’s and Standard and Poor's credit ratings in 1986, and 
received the highest possible ‘AAA’ (KfW 1986,4). In 1987 KfW was the first 
German enterprise to be registered by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), allowing it to issue bonds in the US market. By the late 1980s, ad hoc foreign 
currency borrowing and hedging were replaced by a permanent foreign currency book 
in US Dollars, Yen and Swiss Francs (KfW 1989, 14) and by 1990 foreign currency 
loans accounted for over half of KfWs export finance (KfW 1990, 46). 
 
Figure 2: KfW sources of funds as percentage of total funding  
 
Source: KfW annual reports, various years 
Note: other funding sources include private bank loans and credit linked notes. Data on public funding 
is no longer published in the annual reports after 2004; Figure is negative in 1984 due to KfW having 
to buy back its own bonds to keep the market price up; the brief drop in capital market funds in 2007 
and 2008 is due to risk aversion during the financial crisis. 
 
The period of convergence following Maastricht Treaty of 1992 in the run-up 
to the introduction of the Euro gave new impetus to the German government to reign 
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in spending to conform to the debt rules of the Stability and Growth Pact.  Conducting 
industrial policy through KfW’s self-financed loans became even more attractive, 
because according to European statistical conventions, as long as financing decisions 
did not require explicit government endorsement for projects, these loans did not 
count towards the 3 % deficit-to-GDP ratio, despite their government guarantee 
(European Communities 2002; European Commission 2015, 8).  
The introduction of the Euro in 1999, and its subsequent acceptance as a major 
international reserve currency proved to be a turning point for KfW. A much wider 
range of European and international investors were now interested in bonds in its 
home currency, which it could also use to fund domestic programs, guaranteeing it a 
long-term, stable source of cheap funding. KfW’s official funding strategy became 
focused on ‘repositioning KfW as a European benchmark issuer in the global capital 
markets’ (KfW 2000, 9). The 2001 merger with the state-owned Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank (DtA), was motivated by improving KfW’s position on international 
capital markets through larger issue volumes (KfW 2000, 58). 
By the 2000s, KfW considered that it had ‘earned itself a first-class position as 
a global issuer’ (KfW 2005, 84). Indeed KfW’s capital market issues suffered only 
very briefly during the 2007/8 financial crisis, and after the Eurozone crisis, KfW’s 
bonds were seen as a safe haven asset due to the German government guarantee, with 
KfW easily achieving its targeted funding volume (KfW 2010, 93)12. The interest 
rates it borrowed at were now so low, that the profit it earned on other parts of its 
business was by and large sufficient to cross-subsidise its preferential loans without 
direct government support. This minimised the need for public funds, and the volume 
of KfW funds coming from the Federal Budget and ERP funds continued to gradually 
decline in importance (see figure 2). In 2007 ERP fund in the amount of 12.5 bn. Euro 
was re-organised and a large part was given to KfW as an equity injection. After that, 
KfW began to raise nearly all of its funds on the international capital markets, in over 
16 different countries and all major currencies, with only a small percentage coming 
directly from the ministries (KfW 2008- 2015).    
 
Coping with international trade finance regulations: KfW’s export finance under 																																																								
12 While bringing benefits, KfW’s reliance on international capital markets might also create new risks. 
If the German government is downgraded, or if the Euro ceases to be seen as a strong currency. 
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Neoliberalism 
 
Another important challenge to KfW’s operations was the rise of international 
trade agreements. The OECD Arrangement on export financing of the late 1970s, and 
the creation of the WTO in 1994 limited subsidised export finance, KfWs main tool of 
post-war export promotion. Thanks to its ability to raise finance on the capital 
markets, KfW could lend at what it claimed were ‘market rates’ and circumvent 
OECD rules. Despite KfW not being completely immune to challenges at the WTO, 
especially from equally large trading powers, or key emerging markets, KfW’s 
activities did not come under existential threat due to Germany’s market power, 
which was augmented by membership in the EU13, and aggressive strategies at the 
WTO. 
 
The OECD Arrangement 
 
Efforts to limit aggressive competition between industrialised countries to give 
their exporters advantages through the provision of subsidised export credit 
culminated in the OECD ‘Arrangement for Officially Supported Export Credits’ of 
1978, henceforth the ‘Arrangement’ (Moravscik 1989; Mulligan 2007; OECD 2008). 
Common limits were placed on the terms under which government-subsidised or 
‘official’ trade credits could be granted, including minimum interest rates, maturities, 
down payments, and repayment schedules, in an attempt to ‘encourage competition 
among exporters’ (OECD 2008, 5). Various amendments were made, which reduced 
the amount of subsidy allowed, and created additional sector specific rules (‘Sector 
Understandings’) (Mulligan 2007; OECD 2008).  
While KfW continued providing state-subsidised finance in its capacity as an 
official export credit agency (ECA)14, it also exploited a number of loopholes in the 
1978 and subsequent Arrangements in order to maintain an edge over its OECD 
competitors. Until the 1970s, all of KfW’s export financing was partially subsidised 
by Federal government funds (KfW 1970, 44). As Arrangement rules were tightened 
over time, KfW increasingly began to fund export loans mainly through the capital 																																																								
13 The EU is referred to as the European Communities at the WTO 14	An ECA is a public entity that provides government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance to 
corporations from their home country that do business abroad	
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market, without any direct Federal or ERP subsidies, and lent them at what it claimed 
were ‘market rates’, because such lending was not bound by Arrangement rules. The 
US EXIM bank, which monitors competition in export promotion, terms this capital 
market financed export lending ‘market window activity’ and defines market 
windows as ‘government-owned institutions that claim to offer export credit on 
market terms, thereby circumventing the OECD Arrangement rules’ (US EXIM Bank 
2009, 79). While all major industrialised countries, and large emerging market 
economies have ECAs (Hopewell 2017), Germany and the Canada are the only two 
that have had long-standing market windows (Rodriguez 2001, 11). 
KfW’s market window finance gave it advantages over both competing 
official ECAs and private commercial banks. KfW’s government guarantee 15 , 
exemption from taxes on its profits, and no obligation to pay dividends to its 
shareholders, translated to lower funding costs, which enabled it to offer cheaper 
loans, and take more risk than commercial banks16 (Mendelowitz 2001, US EXIM 
Bank 2009, 79). On the other hand, KfW’s market window was not subject to 
Arrangement reporting requirements, giving it more flexibility than official ECAs 
(Rodriguez 2001).  The US EXIM bank estimated that by 1999, 86 % of KfW’s 
export financing operations were conducted on a market window basis, and that KfW 
was the largest market window in the world (Rodriguez 2001, 11).  
KfW’s continued promotion of the large civil aircraft sector after the post-war 
era provides a good example of how the Arrangement did not prevent KfW from 
giving German and European firms advantages over their competitors. In 1986, a 
Large Civil Aircraft Sector Understanding (LASU) on export credits was signed 
between the European ECAs and US EXIM bank, as part of the OECD Arrangement 
(OECD 2008). LASU provided minimum terms and conditions for subsidised finance 
by ECAs in order to prevent competition between Airbus and US manufacturers on 
concessionary financing. It also established an informal ‘Home Market Rule’ which 
prohibited European ECAs from financing Airbus sales into US markets, and vice 
versa (Berg and Verspyck 2011).   
KfW circumvented these rules by providing export loans to Airbus on a 																																																								
15 The government guarantee for KfW’s market window was explicit until 2008 when market and 
official window operations were conducted within the same legal entity. After 2008, KfW’s market 
window operations became legally independent as KfW-IPEX, but still owned by the parent company, 
making the government guarantee implicit. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
16 Firms have reported that KfW offers market window financing a full basis point lower than 
commercial banks (Mendelowitz 2001, 175) 
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market window basis rather than as an official ECA17 (KfW 1987; 1988, 31), making 
.Airbus’s sales more attractive to foreign buyers than those of US aircraft 
manufacturers (KfW 1990, 50). In addition to being cheaper than private finance, 
KfW’s market window finance was not bound by LASU conditions for official ECAs. 
While US EXIM was prevented by LASU ‘Home Market Rules’ from financing 
Boeing sales in Germany, France, the UK, or Spain (KfW 1990, 50; Mendelowitz 
2001, 181), KfW could finance Airbus sales the US market using its market window. 
KfW’s market window could also support financing structures of 15-18 year 
maturities, while a 12 year limit was placed on EXIM’s financing under the LASU, 
and KfW was able to commit to support Airbus much earlier in the sales cycle, 
whereas due to the transparency requirements of the LASU, EXIM can only commit 
support after approval by the board (Mendelowitz 2001, 181). This enabled Airbus to 
capture market share from Boeing, and thus increase economies of scale, leading to 
significant increases in long-run productivity. According to Scott Scherer, Vice 
President of Boeing Customer Financing, one such example is when Boeing lost the 
important 1997 ‘Latin Trio’ Trio’ sale of aircraft to three Latin American Airlines to 
Airbus, not because of superior quality or price, but because of KfW’s better 
financing conditions (Scherer, cited in Mendelowitz 2001, 181).  
Thanks to KfW and other member states’ financing, Airbus emerged as a 
serious challenger to Boeing by the late 1980s, increasing  market share to 25 percent 
by 1986 (Majumdar 1987, 501) despite its weak financial position18. Airbus did not 
become competitive with Boeing until well into the 1990s (Golich 1993, 471), and 
finally overtook Boeing in terms of market share only in the early 2000s. The two 
have remained in a neck-to-neck battle since then (Thompson Reuters 2012, 2), 
helped by massive state subsidies on both sides. During the 2000s, KfW finance was 
provided specifically for design, development, and marketing of the new Airbus 
model A350XWB (WTO 2016). KfW’s loan was only to be repaid if the new model 
was successful, thus enabling Airbus to upgrade its models by shifting the risks of 
innovation to the public sector (WTO 2016, 96). According to a WTO panel, Airbus 
would not have been able to launch its new models, had it not been for these subsidies  																																																								17	By 1989, the majority of KfW’s financing for Airbus was provided on a market 
window basis (KfW 1989, 41).	
18 Deutsche Airbus was on the ‘verge of bankruptcy’ in 1989, necessitating a rescue plan by the 
German government, which included KfW providing a DM 505mn capital infusion by taking a 20 
percent equity stake in the company (WTO 2016, 267). 
NAQVI	ET	AL		
19		
(WTO 2011, 558). 19   
KfW began to come under criticism during the early 2000, by US EXIM and 
others who claimed that market window activities fell outside the OECD Safe Haven, 
and therefore were in contravention of WTO law (US EXIM bank, various years). 
However, a lack of concrete evidence, since KfW is not required to release the terms 
of its individual market window deals, and the parties to these transactions are bound 
by confidentiality agreements, made it difficult to take action (Mendelowitz 2001; US 
EXIM 2005). Furthermore, many US companies were reluctant to provide EXIM 
evidence on KfW’s market window activity because they had significant production 
facilities in Germany, and were therefore eligible to benefit from this finance (US 
EXIM 2005, 57). The financial crisis resulted in other countries ramping up their 
export credit provision, with Italy and the Nordic countries launching their own 
market windows (Hopewell 2017; EXIM bank, 2009, 2011, 2013). In this permissive 
environment, complaints from other ECAs against KfW were dropped. While 
organised US exporter groups had been calling for US EXIM to expand its scope in 
order ‘fight fire with fire’ and keep pace with its competitors (Bergsten 2015; 
Hopewell 2017), these efforts became paralysed by internal challenges from the Tea 
Party movement, fuelled by a prevailing market fundamentalist ideology and funded 
by billionaires like the Koch brothers (Hopewell 2017). In this environment, 
initiatives to become competitive with KfW were eclipsed by the struggle to simply 
keep US EXIM alive (Hopewell 2017, 583).   
 
The WTO Rules  
 
When the WTO was founded in 1994, the OECD countries negotiated a 
‘carve-out’ for the OECD Arrangement. The Arrangement was incorporated into 																																																								
19 Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) argue that development bank lending to firms that are already 
competitive, and therefore able to raise finance privately constitutes ‘rent seeking’ rather than industrial 
policy, because this merely subsidises the cost of capital, but does not increase productivity. We 
believe this argument does not apply to industries where there are sufficient scale economies. KfW 
financing remained vital to improving Airbus’s productivity, even after it became internationally 
competitive, through enabling it capture market share, thus increasing economics of scale and long-run 
productivity. Separately, KfW financed risky technological innovation, which would not have been 
financed in private markets.  
 
KICKING	AWAY	THE	FINANCIAL	LADDER	
20		
WTO law, which exempted those export credits issued in conformity with the 
Arrangement from the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), under Annex 1 
(K) of the SCM (Coppens and Friedbacher 2014). In effect, this meant that KfW’s 
Arrangement conforming activities remained legal under WTO rules, and advanced 
economies were allowed to continue to provide subsidised export finance in those 
sectors important for them, while developing countries, many of which did not have 
ECAs, or did not export goods that benefitted from the Sector Understandings, could 
not provide such subsidies under WTO law (Chauffour et al. 2010).  
Being a developed country development bank also meant that KfW was at an 
advantage when it came to the WTO DSM itself, as compliance is dependent on 
power relationships, determined by market size, given that the threat of bilateral 
retaliation is the underlying means of compensation in dispute settlement negotiations 
(Brown 2004). Developing countries often lack resources to bring cases to the DSM 
(Busch and Reinhardt 2003), and even if they do, they might lack enforcement 
capacity because their threat of retaliation may not be meaningful due to their smaller 
market size (Brown 2004, 60).  
Germany has one of the poorest records among OECD countries of notifying 
specific subsidies to the WTO as required under Article 25 of the SCM (Thone and 
Dobroschke 2008, 1), and despite KfW’s sizeable activities, only two disputes 
brought against the EU under the SCM have directly involved it: one brought by 
Korea, a key emerging market that used aggressive tactics at the WTO during the 
early 2000s, (Liao 2016) in the shipbuilding sector, and one brought by the other 
‘twin titan’ of international trade (Garrett and Smith 2002), the US, in the aircraft 
sector.  
In the case of shipbuilding, Korea brought cases against the EU’s 
subsidisation of shipbuilding as retaliation for an earlier case the EU had brought 
against Korea’s subsidisation of its own shipbuilding sector through the Korea 
Development Bank (KDB). In 2004 Korea brought case DS307, accusing the EU of 
unfairly subsidising its shipbuilding industry, and included the German government’s 
guarantee of KfW’s obligations on the list of measures it considered inconsistent with 
the SCM. Given the case was brought to prevent the EU taking future actions against 
the KDB, Korea did not follow up its request for consultations with the second step of 
requesting panel formation, allowing KfW’s activities to continue unchallenged 
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(WTO 2010a; Europe Direct Contact Centre 201720). 
When the industry negatively affected by KfW belongs to a country with 
equal market power, namely the US, the challenge is more significant, but the EU is 
able to fight back through counter-suits, appeals, or procrastination on compliance 
with rulings that are not in its favour. In this case, membership in the EU makes 
continued industrial policy possible, because Germany alone does not have the market 
power to match the US. In the case of aircraft, the US and EU have been embroiled in 
a protracted tit-for-tat conflict at the WTO since 2004, when the US brought case 
DS316 against the European Communities for over 300 instances of subsidization of 
Airbus, and the EU retaliated by bringing two counter-complaints against the US for 
illegally subsiding Boeing. While KfW’s market window activity was not included in 
the list of EU subsidies, KfW’s 1989 equity investment in Deutsche Airbus was, and 
was found by the WTO Panel in 2010 to be a ‘specific subsidy’ in contravention of 
WTO rules since the capital was provided on non-commercial terms (WTO 2010b). 
Following an appeal by the EU, although the Panel reversed some of its findings in 
favour of the EU, it upheld its ruling with respect to KfW’s equity investments (WTO 
2011) and advised the EU to ‘take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects 
or… withdraw the subsidy’ (WTO 2011, 612), though it was not specified how 
exactly this was to be done.  
In 2016, the US brought a complaint that the EU had not only not withdrawn 
its subsidies in compliance with the Appellate body’s ruling, but had expanded its 
subsidy program through the above mentioned LA/MSF program, including through a 
subsidized KfW loan (WTO 2016). The Panel did not find that the LA/MSF were in 
the more serious category of ‘prohibited subsidies’ as the US alleged, but did find 
them to be a ‘specific subsidy’, and also found in favour of the US with regards to the 
EU’s non-compliance with the panel’s previous recommendations, including on 
KfW’s equity investments (WTO 2016, 572). However, the EU appealed this ruling 
on October 2016 (WTO 2017a), and the case is ongoing at the time of writing, 
without action having been taken to remove adverse effects or withdraw the subsidies 
relating to KfW’s equity stake and loans. The counter-suit by the EU against Boeing 
also remains under review at the WTO, and has been subject to a similar process, with 
the Panel finding against the US in some instances, the US appealing the decision, 																																																								20	Email correspondence on 10/17/2017	
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and also being accused of non-compliance with panel rulings by the EU (WTO 
2017b).  
 
The challenge of Europeanisation: Bargaining for Industrial Policy 
 
The Europeanisation process presented another challenge for German 
industrial policy and public banks since many of its core laws were designed to 
minimise state intervention. Despite this, while EU membership did create some 
problems for KfW, it led to no fundamental change in KfW’s activities due to 
Germany’s  position as regional hegemon in the EU, and KfW’s use of creative 
accounting. Below we examine the most significant challenge of Europeanisation for 
KfW: the EU State Subsidies Law21, which ruled KfW’s market window operations to 
be illegal. 
Enforcement of EU State Aid regulations prohibiting government support 
conferred on a selective basis to firms or sectors was weak until the adoption of the 
1998 Regulation EC No 994/98, which was considered a ‘major milestone’ to 
strengthen regulations on state aid (Kassim and Lyons 2013, 9). This was clearly at 
odds with selective industrial policy, which by nature involves providing subsidies to 
certain sectors or firms over others.  
As State Aid regulations became stronger, a number of ‘block exemptions’ to 
the state subsidies law were negotiated from 1998 onwards, which allowed member 
states to implement certain state aid measure in these sectors without ex ante approval 
by the commission (Blauberger 2009). These corresponded to areas to which KfW 
was already lending at the time, and by implication, those areas Germany was 
supporting as part of its industrial policy, including renewable energies, SMEs, 
regional development, and technology and innovation promotion, and infrastructure, 
allowing KfW to continue providing support in those areas. While the European 
Commission has a degree of control over the design of State Aid law, it is often 
unable to issue and enforce these laws over strong member state opposition 
(Blauberger 2009; Clift 2012) Given Germany’s strong position in the EU, although 																																																								
21 Other important potential challenges included the Maastricht Treaty, the effect of which has already 
been discussed, EU Banking Regulations, and the post crisis ECB Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). Since KfW was not classified as a bank under German law, the latter two simply did not apply 
to it.  
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negotiation documents are not public, it is reasonable to assume that Germany played 
some role in negotiating exemptions in its favour. 
In 1999, a more direct challenge emerged. The European Banking Federation 
filed a complaint against the German government’s liability (Anstaltslast) and 
refinancing guarantee (Gewährträgerhaftung) for its public banks (Volberding, 
forthcoming). This led to a series of negotiations between the EU Directorate General 
Competition, the, Federal Ministry of Finance, VOEB, and KfW, in 2002 (KfW 
2001), which resulted in ‘Understanding 1 & 2’ (Verständigung I & II), a direct 
application of EU State Aid Law to the German public banks. The Understanding 
stipulated that the Sparkassen and Landesbanken lost their state guarantees 
(Verständigung I), but the German Ministry of Finance managed to secure a number 
of clauses that enabled nine of the Förderbanken including KfW, to retain these 
advantages as long as they only carried out a defined list of permitted ‘promotional’ 
activities (Verständigung II, 2002, 4). If the Förderbanks were conducting any 
activities outside this remit, these were required to be hived off into a separate legal 
entity, where they could continue these activities without direct government 
guarantees and would be subject to competition law without exemptions (Seikel 2014; 
Verständigung II, 13). 
‘Promotional’ activities included subsidised finance to sectors included in the 
State Subsidy Block exemptions mentioned above (Verständigung II, 11-13), so 
KfW’s domestic operations were not affected. Subsidised export finance within the 
EU was not allowed (Ibid.), but this mattered little, as German exporters enjoyed low 
effective exchange rates compared to other countries using the Euro (Hall 2012). 
Outside the EU, KfW was allowed to operate as an official ECA, but its market 
window activity was not allowed unless the transaction took place in a consortium 
where a private bank acted as lead arranger (Verständigung II, 13). KfW was 
therefore forced to restructure its operations where its Understanding-compliant 
businesses were reorganised into five subsidiaries22 and kept within KfW, while its 
market window activities were separated into the International Project and Export 
																																																								
22 These were the Mittelstand (SME) bank, the Privatkundenbank, and Kommunalbank which 
lend to domestic SMEs, large corporations, and municipal governments, KfW Entwicklungs 
(development) Bank which finances projects in developing countries, and the DEG, which provides 
advice and technical expertise.  
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Finance (KfW-IPEX) bank, which became legally independent in 2008 (KfW 2001, 
11, KfW 2008).  
While it was expected that the Understandings would put an end of KfW’s 
combination of market window and commercial activities, the restructuring proved to 
be ultimately cosmetic in nature From the point of view of KfW, the negotiations 
were a success as they ensured ‘that we will be able to continue to support the 
German and European economies with the entire range of the products of the KFW 
Group’ (KFW 2001, 11, emphasis added).  
KfW retained tight control over the activities of its subsidiary, ensuring it 
could not function as a profit-oriented private bank. Officially, IPEX sees its mission 
as supporting KfW’s promotional mandate, rather than to maximising profits; ‘We 
consider ourselves to be a part of the statutory mandate and mission of KfW to 
strengthen the German and European economies for the long term against the 
background of advancing globalisation’ (IPEX 2008, 15). Although the two entities 
are legally separate, high ranking KfW board members, as well as Ministry of Finance 
and Economics representatives have dominated the board of the IPEX bank since its 
inception, ensuring IPEX’s activities are aligned with KfW’s interests (KfW IPEX 
annual reports, various issues).  
Furthermore, the use of creative accounting means that IPEX is able not only 
to carry out market window activities as intended in the Understandings, but also 
conducts KfW’s international promotional activities on a ‘fiduciary basis’ (Standard 
and Poor’s 2016, 5). In 2008, for example, over 40 % of IPEX’s loan volume was 
made up of promotional activities conducted on behalf of KfW (KfW 2008, 93). In 
terms of export finance volume and sectoral focus, IPEX continues to focus on the 
industrial sector, including shipping, mechanical and automotive engineering, 
renewable energies, aircraft, and basic industries (KfW IPEX 2012, 28). In effect, 
IPEX acts as KfW’s international financing arm, rather than as an independent 
company.  
Finally, although it is meant to be a commercial institution, IPEX’s status as 
KfW’s subsidiary ensures that it continues to benefit from lower than market funding 
costs. IPEX’s receives its financing almost exclusively from KfW, along with a 
liquidity guarantee (Standard and Poor’s 2016). Although KfW claims it finances 
IPEX at ‘market rates’, that are calculated according to IPEX’s ratings (IPEX 2008, 
51), this is not strictly true because IPEX’s ratings are better than they would 
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otherwise be precisely because of this funding relationship (Moody’s 2013; Standard 
and Poor’s 2016). Standard and Poor’s notes that key factors in boosting IPEX’s 
rating to AA+ status are ‘implicit benefits of ownership by KfW, especially in terms 
of funding and liquidity’, and ‘IPEX's status as a government-related entity (GRE) 
and our view of an extremely high likelihood of timely and sufficient support from 
the German government if needed’ (Standard and Poor’s 2016, 2-3). 
 
GOING ‘GREEN’: INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENIA 
 
Despite the challenges discussed above, KfW, with the support of the Federal 
government, has retained its ability to conduct selective industrial policy in the 2000s, 
on both the domestic and the international levels. As table 1 shows, KfW’s post-80s 
policy tools remain very similar to those during the post-war era, with the main 
difference being how they are funded. While specific sectors targeted have changed 
over time, the focus remains on high value added or technology intensive sectors with 
a high degree of linkages and spillover effects with the rest of the economy.  
 
Table 1: KfW’s industrial policy from post-war to present 
Source: KfW annual reports (1949-2015) 
 
Postwar(era((60s(and(70s) Post180s(era((90s(and(2000s)
International(sectoral(
focus
Industrial+plant+and+machinery,+
aircraft,+ships,+basic+industry
Ships,+basic+industry,+aircraft+,+
renewable+energy+plant+and+
technology,+industrial+plant+and+
machinery
Domestic(sectoral(
focus
Capital+goods,+engineering,+coal+and+
steel,+raw+materials+procurement,+
housing
+Renewable+energies,+innovation,+
housing+energy+efficiency
Domestic(policy(tools
Provision+of+credit+on+preferntial+
terms,+subsidised+directed+credit+
programs+
Provision+of+credit+on+preferntial+
terms,+subsidised+directed+credit+
programs+
External(policy(tools
Subsidised+export+finance,+
subisidised+project+finance+for+
outward+FDI,+tied+and+untied+
development+aid
Subsidised+export+finance,++
'market+window'/commercial+
export+finance,+subisidised+
finance+for+outward+FDI,+untied+
development+aid
Funding(sources Federal+government+and+ERP+funds Capital+market+funds
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Although KfW covers many important financing needs including through its 
special programs for SMEs and innovation23, the most compelling example of how it 
continues to conduct selective industrial policy in the 2000s is its crucial role in 
promoting the German renewable energies industry. Germany is widely touted as a 
success story in the promotion of wind and solar renewable energies. This spectacular 
rise in the use of renewable energies would have been impossible if left to market 
forces, due to the fact that renewables not only rely on costly new technologies, but 
also have to overcome a massive sunk cost advantage of incumbent technologies, 
such as fossil fuels (Mazzucato 2013, Connor 2003). Despite Denmark having the 
first mover advantage in the renewables sector (Connor 2003), Germany successfully 
caught up during the late 1990s, and 2000s. Domestic installed capacity has grown 
exponentially (figure 3), and by 2014, three out of the top ten wind turbine 
manufacturers were German companies, Enercon, Siemens, and Nordex, with a 
combined world market share of 21.5 % (Energy Digital 2014). The German strategy 
has been to focus initially on production for the domestic market, and then to move 
towards export promotion, since about 2002/3 when the domestic market began to 
reach saturation (Lund 2009).  Key policy tools were the introduction of feed-in 
tariffs24 in the late 1990s to promote domestic demand (Lund 2009), and provision of 
subsidised long-term finance to promote investment, mainly by KfW. A KfW report 
states that ‘Since the Federal Government launched the energy turnaround in 2011… 
KfW has significantly expanded its promotion in these areas, and will continue to 
lend impetus as a partner to the Federal Government’ (KfW 2013, 65). 
 
Figure 3: Installed renewables capacity in Germany and major promotional 
programmes 
																																																								23	For example, the KfW Innovation Programme for SMEs was ‘intended to round off the Federal 
Government promotion of research and development, R& D), which is strongly oriented to basic 
research… [KfW’s] loan finance for application-oriented R&D will lead to a helpful solution for the 
company, if the company cannot fund all the work itself as is the usual practice’ (KfW 1994, 28). 	
24 These provide renewable energy producers a guaranteed price at which they can sell to the energy 
supplier, providing the producers with long-term security to encourage investment. The ultimate cost is 
passed on to the consumer. 
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Source: Installed capacity data from AGEE-Stat database. Policy data from IEA/IRENA database, 
Lauber and Pesendorfer (2004)  
 
Since renewables began in Germany as an ‘infant industry’ (Connor 2003) 
private bank finance was not initially forthcoming (Griffith-Jones 2016). KfW 
therefore provided a very significant portion of total domestic renewables finance in 
Germany, especially during the mid-2000’s (KfW annual reports). Including co-
financed projects25, it is estimated that about 80 % of wind energy plant development, 
and 40 % of total renewable energy development in Germany has been financed by 
KfW (KfW annual report 2011). This finance is generally available as part of one of 
KfW’s special renewable energies programs, where long term credit is provided at 
subsidised interest rates and other favourable conditions (see figure 3). These massive 
domestic ‘state subsidies’ did not go against EU Law, because investment aid for the 
promotion of energy from renewable sources became one of the sectors covered in the 
General Block Exemption Regulations. 
Since the mid-2000s, a key aspect of renewables industrial policy has been to 
increase economies of scale by exporting German renewables products to developing 
countries.. IPEX has been crucial in helping large German renewable firms become 
and remain competitive internationally through direct provision export and project 
finance. Given that an OECD sector understanding on Renewables was introduced on 
a trial basis in 2005 (Mulligan 2007), IPEX can provide this aid at favourable 																																																								
25 Which in many cases would not have been possible without KfW financing, as KfW plays the role of 
lead bank in consortium lending.  
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conditions both in its capacity as an official ECA, and through its market window. 
KfW Entwicklungsbank and German Investment Corporation (DEG) support IPEX’s 
direct promotion of German firms by financing renewables projects in developing 
countries in order to increase the demand for German renewable firms technology 
exports (KfW annual reports, various years).  By 2011, KfW was the most important 
promoter of renewable energies worldwide, together the World Bank (KfW annual 
report 2011) 
Although Germany has used extensive state-support to develop its own 
renewables industry, it has been active (along with other EU countries and the US26) 
in attempting to kick away China’s ladder to do the same. In 2009 German solar 
companies SolarWorld and Coenergy27 requested the EU to conduct an anti-dumping 
investigation of China’s solar exports (Lewis 2014, 16). China has still use similar 
tactics to the US and EU to use state subsidised finance to accomplish its industrial 
policy goals (Lewis 2014, 18-20). This indicates that a handful of key emerging 
markets with large domestic markets and significant legal resources are able to 
provide financial support similar to the KfW, despite developed country opposition. 
 
CONCLUSION: POWERFUL STATES MAKING ROOM TO MOVE 
 
While the post-1980s era of ‘neoliberal globalisation’ is typically associated 
with the ‘roll back’ of the state from economic life, the evidence presented in this 
paper shows that the role of state intervention in German finance has been important 
not only during the post-war era, but has gained even more importance after the 
1980s. While post-1980s financial globalisation is usually associated with the end of 
state-directed finance, despite official rhetoric about curtailing government 
expenditures and scaling back state intervention, this was not the case in Germany, 
even as some parts of the financial system were liberalised. Ironically, the increase in 
KfW’s size was made possible by its strategic use of financial globalisation; KfW’s 
borrowing on international and domestic capital markets enabled it to overcome the 
mounting funding crisis it faced since the 1970s, since funds raised in this way did not 
count towards the government debt. It seems that, in the case of Germany, financial 
																																																								
26 The US coalition of solar manufacturers (CASM) that initiated investigations against China was led 
by the US arm of the German SolarWorld (Lewis 2014).  
27 A coalition of European solar producers called ProSun was later formed to lead the filing of 
complaints at the WTO. 	
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globalisation has had important ‘state augmenting’ effects through enabling selective 
industrial policy. 
Findings on KfW’s post-1980s role in selective industrial policy challenge the 
assumption made in some of the literature on industrial policy that financial 
globalisation and the proliferation of trade and investment agreements has made many 
forms of industrial policy non-viable. Not only did the external challenges of 
international and regional agreements fail to render KfW defunct, KfW retained its 
core functions and continued to prioritise high value added manufacturing after the 
1980s. As KfW’s strong and successful industrial policy towards renewable energies 
and its continued support of Airbus show, many routes still remain open to advanced 
countries wishing to conduct such sectoral promotion. However, as the contrast with 
Hopewell’s (2017) account of the US EXIM bank shows, this is conditional on the 
domestic politics being supportive of such an institution.  
More generally, the German case shows that as developing countries’ policy 
space has been curtailed, powerful countries benefit from the unequal nature of the 
international economy, and are able to both shape international economic agreements, 
and exploit loopholes in them to their advantage. KfW’s ability to continue funding 
itself cheaply on the international capital markets remains closely tied to the German 
government’s high credit rating, and to the Euro’s status as an international reserve 
currency. This means that while such funding options are available for key advanced 
economies, this is not a path open to developing countries, which cannot rely on 
international financial markets for stable and low cost borrowing due to poor ratings 
and soft currencies. 
Similarly, the carve out for the OECD Arrangement in the WTO, gives 
Germany, an Arrangement member, advantages over developing countries. In 
addition, KfW exploited loopholes in the Arrangement to use ‘market window’ 
financing to maintain a competitive edge over other Arrangement members. Although 
KfW has faced significant challenges at the WTO, these have not rendered it defunct, 
thanks to Germany’s membership in the EU, which gives it market power equivalent 
to that of the US. In Europe, Germany’s status as a regional hegemon meant that the 
EU State Subsidies Law reflected its preferences to some degree. Although some 
compromises with made with regards to other German public banks, the German 
government negotiated a deal that allowed KfW to continue conducting its core 
activities largely unimpeded. All in all, it seems that, contingent on their domestic 
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politics, industrialised countries have a number of advantages over developing 
countries when it comes to conducting selective industrial policy despite the 
constraints of the international economic system.  
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